How to Make the Fine Fit the Corporate Crime? An Analysis of Static and Dynamic Optimal Punishment Theories
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- Leung, Siu Fai, 1991. "How to make the fine fit the corporate crime? : An analysis of static and dynamic optimal punishment theories," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 243-256, July.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Motchenkova, Evgenia, 2008.
"Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting,"
European Journal of Operational Research,
Elsevier, vol. 189(1), pages 269-291, August.
- Motchenkova, E., 2004. "Determination of Optimal Penalities for Antitrust Violations in a Dynamic Setting," Discussion Paper 2004-019, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Motchenkova, E., 2004. "Determination of Optimal Penalties for Antitrust Violations in a Dynamic Setting," Discussion Paper 2004-96, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- E. Motchenkova & P. M. Kort, 2006.
"Analysis of Current Penalty Schemes for Violations of Antitrust Laws,"
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications,
Springer, vol. 128(2), pages 431-451, February.
- Kort, P. M. & Motchenkova, E., 2006. "Analysis of Current Penalty Schemes for Violations of Antitrust Laws," MPRA Paper 17227, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Motchenkova, E. & Kort, P.M., 2006. "Analysis of current penalty schemes for violations of antitrust laws," Other publications TiSEM 0cbc7914-8fbb-40f5-8feb-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Sana Abusin, 2012. "Dynamic deterrence analysis of factors affecting the management of Sudan Fishery," Working Papers 309, Economic Research Southern Africa.
- Nuno Garoupa, 2004. "Dynamic Law Enforcement with Learning," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 192-206, April.
- Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson, 2004. "Land Encroachment: India’s Disappearing Common Lands," CSAE Working Paper Series 2004-28, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
- Éric Darmon & Thomas Le Texier, 2014. "Private or Public Law Enforcement? The Case of Digital Piracy Policies with Non-monitored Illegal Behaviors," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201403, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Stafford, Sarah L., 2002. "The Effect of Punishment on Firm Compliance with Hazardous Waste Regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 290-308, September.
- repec:spr:joptap:v:176:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10957-017-1208-y is not listed on IDEAS
- Evgenia Motchenkova, 2014.
"Cost minimizing sequential punishment policies for repeat offenders,"
Applied Economics Letters,
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(5), pages 360-365, March.
- Motchenkova, Evgenia, 2006. "Cost Minimizing Sequential Punishment Policies for Repeat Offenders," Serie Research Memoranda 0008, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
- Takayoshi Shinkuma & Shunsuke Managi, 2012. "Effectiveness of policy against illegal disposal of waste," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(2), pages 123-145, April.
- Motchenkova, E. & Kort, P.M., 2004. "Analysis of the Properties of Current Penalty Schemes for Violations of Antitrust Law," Discussion Paper 2004-97, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
More about this item
Keywordscrimes ; costs ; economic models;
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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