La leva istituzionale dell’autonomia: un freno allo sviluppo locale?
The following paper deals with a particular feature of local government within the italian institutional system by using the usual methods of economic analysis. It shows the possibility for regional authorities to reduce, delay or even obstruct the results that national policies can produce. If national policies liberalize a given economic sector, the rules protecting local identity may cause loss of welfare. This happens when regional administrators have the opportunity to reap a part of (or all) the monopolistic rent through their public positions. This work refers to the rules of the constitutional law that the Sicilian region has recently exploited.
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- Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1995.
"On the Number and Size of Nations,"
NBER Working Papers
5050, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pauly, Mark V., 1973. "Income redistribution as a local public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 35-58, February.
- Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
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