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Corporate gouvernance et les déterminants de la pratique du e-vote
[Corporate governance and the determinants of e-voting]

Author

Listed:
  • Henchiri, jamel E.

Abstract

The communication questioned if the e-vote introduced recently into the companies listed on Euronext100 is the required result of a policy of corporate governance in favour of a better transparency of information and a stronger participation of the shareholders in the decisions. The results of the investigation carried out are first of all presented. It is found that these companies are rather of more important size but of performance generally worse. Then, we carried out comparative tests of some explanatory data, in term of corporate governance, with the quality of the practice of the e-vote. It is observed that these are companies whose capital is more diffuse and which there is not statistical differences in term of presence at the Annual General Meetings. The e-vote thus exceeds the simple stage of the improvement of the administrative process of the management of these meetings. Lastly, the discussion relates to the impact of new rules of transparency for the corporate governorship.

Suggested Citation

  • Henchiri, jamel E., 2007. "Corporate gouvernance et les déterminants de la pratique du e-vote [Corporate governance and the determinants of e-voting]," MPRA Paper 74525, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Aug 2007.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:74525
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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