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Relevance or irrelevance of retention for dividend policy irrelevance

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  • Magni, Carlo Alberto

Abstract

In an interesting recent paper, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) highlight that Miller and Modigliani's (1961) proof of dividend irrelevance is based on the assumption that the amount of dividends distributed to shareholders is equal or greater than the free cash flow generated by the fixed investment policy. They claim that, if retention is allowed, dividend policy is not irrelevant. This paper clarifies and reinterprets DeAngelo and DeAngelo's result: Retention itself has not to do with dividend irrelevance, which holds even in case of retention. The key assumption has to do with the NPV of the extra funds (either retained or raised): If NPV is zero, dividend irrelevance applies. Yet, the dichotomy retention/no-retention is useful, because if agency problems are present, managers tend to retain funds and invest them in negative-NPV projects, and therefore the zero-NPV assumption must be removed, so that dividend irrelevance does not apply any more.

Suggested Citation

  • Magni, Carlo Alberto, 2007. "Relevance or irrelevance of retention for dividend policy irrelevance," MPRA Paper 5591, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5591
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15689/1/MPRA_paper_15689.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, 1961. "Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34, pages 411-411.
    4. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda, 2006. "The irrelevance of the MM dividend irrelevance theorem," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 293-315, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Magni, Carlo Alberto, 2016. "Capital depreciation and the underdetermination of rate of return: A unifying perspective," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 54-79.
    2. Magni, Carlo Alberto, 2010. "Residual income and value creation: An investigation into the lost-capital paradigm," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 201(2), pages 505-519, March.
    3. Vélez-Pareja, Ignacio & Magni, Carlo Alberto, 2008. "Potential dividends and actual cash flows. Theoretical and empirical reasons for using ‘actual’ and dismissing ‘potential’, Or: How not to pull potential rabbits out of actual hats," MPRA Paper 7266, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Carlo Alberto Magni & Ignacio Velez-Pareja, 2009. "Potential dividends versus actual cash flows in firm valuation," Proyecciones Financieras y Valoración 5516, Master Consultores.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dividend policy; irrelevance; retention; zero-NPV; epistemology; agency theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • G0 - Financial Economics - - General
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies

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