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A Comment on "Cycles and Instability in a Rock-Paper-Scissors Population Game: A Continuous Time Experiment"

Author

Listed:
  • Wang, Zhijian
  • Zhu, Siqian
  • Xu, Bin

Abstract

The authors (Cason, Friedman and Hopkins, Review of Economic Studies, 2014) claimed that control treatments (using simultaneous matching in discrete time) replicate previous results that exhibit weak or no cycles. After correcting two mathematical mistakes in their cycles tripwire algorithm, we study the cycles by scanning the tripwire in the full strategy space of the games and we find significant cycles that were omitted by the authors. So we suggest that all of the treatments exhibit significant cycles.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Zhijian & Zhu, Siqian & Xu, Bin, 2013. "A Comment on "Cycles and Instability in a Rock-Paper-Scissors Population Game: A Continuous Time Experiment"," MPRA Paper 51691, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:51691
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51691/1/MPRA_paper_51691.pdf
    File Function: original version
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Timothy N. Cason & Daniel Friedman & ED Hopkins, 2014. "Cycles and Instability in a Rock--Paper--Scissors Population Game: A Continuous Time Experiment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 112-136.
    2. Xu, Bin & Zhou, Hai-Jun & Wang, Zhijian, 2013. "Cycle frequency in standard Rock–Paper–Scissors games: Evidence from experimental economics," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 392(20), pages 4997-5005.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    experiments; learning; cycles; mixed equilibrium; discrete time;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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