I discuss goals of institutional experimentation as well as obstacles for its realization. The special attention is given to regional experiments. Institutional experiment reduces transformation costs, in particular, by diminishing probability of formation of erroneous reforms trap. The analyses of introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension component in several tens of countries and the history of introduction of the Unified State Examination in Russia show the importance of planning the experiments in advance and using objective procedures of assessment of their results. The reasons for adopting a law on the institutional experiment are given.
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gérard Roland, 2000.
"Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets, and Firms,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262182033.
- Gérard Roland, 2004. "Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets, and Firms," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026268148x.
- Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:50071. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.