Sezession: Ein gefährliches Spiel
[Secession: a dangerous game]
The problem posed by a potential exit from a political union or federation of states is not a new one. In the current crisis the potential exit from a monetary union is particularly relevant. Not long ago, potential exit has been an important topic in Canada. The analyses of the consequences of a potential exit of the province of Quebec can also be applied to the actual crisis of the European Monetary System. The results of the Canadian analyses show that exit involves the risk of major conflicts – even if both sides have strong preferences for a mutual agreement.
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- Robert Young, 1994. "The political economy of secession: The case of Quebec," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 221-245, March.
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