Seigniorage, taxation and myopia in EMU
We examine fiscal policy coordination in a two-country world with two types of asymmetries. The first type of asymmetry is a difference in the efficiency of taxation systems, the second is a varying degree of myopia as represented by discount rates. We examine the conditions under which cooperation is beneficial for both countries and we examine how asymmetries affect the loss inflicted by discretion. Our results show that if asymmetries are too great, EMU has poor welfare properties.
|Date of creation:||Apr 1993|
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- Levine, Paul L & Pearlman, Joseph, 1993. "Optimal Tax Policy, Government Myopia and Insolvency," CEPR Discussion Papers 768, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, 1997.
"Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt712610vq, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, 1991. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," CEPR Discussion Papers 519, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Maurice Obstfeld, 1989. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," NBER Working Papers 2869, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Maurice Obstfeld and ., 1997. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C97-085, University of California at Berkeley.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, 1997. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers 233606, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
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