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Il rapporto tra impresa e agenzia di rating: la soluzione del multi-rating

  • Mattarocci, Gianluca

The credit rating market is characterized by low competition and a potential conflict of interest, due to the system of remuneration of the rating services, which impairs the reliability of the judgement delivered. Multiple credit rating means further costs for companies, because of the fees paid to more than one rating agency, but it does bring significant benefits in terms of the dissemination, on the market, of judgements concerning the companies. This paper examines the relationship between the number of rating announcements concerning a company and the performance of the securities issued by that company, besides the effects of discordant ratings assigned to a company by different rating agencies (so-called “split rating”), and presents a detailed study of multiple credit rating and of the advantages determined by the placement of issued securities at higher prices, in connection with the new ratings assigned by different agencies. An analysis of split-rating completes this overview of the issue, highlighting how the weight carried by the different rating agencies can affect market reactions.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 4295.

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Date of creation: Jan 2005
Date of revision: Mar 2005
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4295
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  1. Marshall E. Blume & Felix Lim & A. Craig Mackinlay, 1998. "The Declining Credit Quality of U.S. Corporate Debt: Myth or Reality?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1389-1413, 08.
  2. Ferri, Giovanni & Liu, Li-Gang & Majnoni, Giovanni, 2001. "The role of rating agency assessments in less developed countries: Impact of the proposed Basel guidelines," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 115-148, January.
  3. Marcia H. Millon & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies," Finance 0411024, EconWPA.
  4. Marshall E. Blume & Felix Lim & A. Craig MacKinlay, . "The Declining Credit Quality of US Corporate Debt: Myth or Reality?," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 3-98, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  5. Marshall E. Blume & Felix Lim & A. Craig MacKinlay, . "The Declining Credit Quality of US Corporate Debt: Myth or Reality?," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 03-98, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  6. Christoph Kuhner, 2001. "Financial Rating Agencies: Are They Credible? – Insights Into The Reporting Incentives Of Rating Agencies In Times Of Enhanced Systemic Risk," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 53(1), pages 2-26, January.
  7. Williamson, Oliver E, 1969. "Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 105-18, May.
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  9. Grier, Paul & Katz, Steven, 1976. "The Differential Effects of Bond Rating Changes among Industrial and Public Utility Bonds by Maturity," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(2), pages 226-39, April.
  10. Sorensen, Eric H, 1979. "The Impact of Underwriting Method and Bidder Competition upon Corporate Bond Interest Cost," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 34(4), pages 863-70, September.
  11. Mattarocci, Gianluca, 2005. "Il rapporto tra impresa e agenzia di rating: la soluzione del multi-rating," MPRA Paper 4295, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2005.
  12. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  13. Hand, John R M & Holthausen, Robert W & Leftwich, Richard W, 1992. " The Effect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 733-52, June.
  14. Giovanni Ferri, 2004. "More analysts, better ratings: Do rating agencies invest enough in less developed countries?," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 77-98, May.
  15. Katz, Steven, 1974. "The Price Adjustment Process of Bonds to Rating Reclassifications: A Test of Bond Market Efficiency," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 29(2), pages 551-59, May.
  16. Thompson, G Rodney & Vaz, Peter, 1990. "Dual Bond Ratings: A Test of the Certification Function of Rating Agencies," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 25(3), pages 457-71, August.
  17. Richard Cantor & Frank Packer & Kevin Cole, 1997. "Split ratings and the pricing of credit risk," Research Paper 9711, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  18. Ilia D. Dichev, 2001. "The Long-Run Stock Returns Following Bond Ratings Changes," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 173-203, 02.
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