Il rapporto tra impresa e agenzia di rating: la soluzione del multi-rating
The credit rating market is characterized by low competition and a potential conflict of interest, due to the system of remuneration of the rating services, which impairs the reliability of the judgement delivered. Multiple credit rating means further costs for companies, because of the fees paid to more than one rating agency, but it does bring significant benefits in terms of the dissemination, on the market, of judgements concerning the companies. This paper examines the relationship between the number of rating announcements concerning a company and the performance of the securities issued by that company, besides the effects of discordant ratings assigned to a company by different rating agencies (so-called “split rating”), and presents a detailed study of multiple credit rating and of the advantages determined by the placement of issued securities at higher prices, in connection with the new ratings assigned by different agencies. An analysis of split-rating completes this overview of the issue, highlighting how the weight carried by the different rating agencies can affect market reactions.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2005|
|Date of revision:||Mar 2005|
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