Financial Rating Agencies: Are They Credible? – Insights Into The Reporting Incentives Of Rating Agencies In Times Of Enhanced Systemic Risk
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- Schaetzle, Dominik, 2011. "Ökonomische Funktionen von Ratingagenturen: Ratingagenturen in der neoinstitutionalistischen Finanzierungstheorie," Arbeitspapiere 113, University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives.
- Mathis, Jérôme & McAndrews, James & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2009. "Rating the raters: Are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 657-674, July.
- Bappaditya Mukhopadhyay, 2004. "Moral Hazard with Rating Agency: An Incentive Contracting Approach," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 5(2), pages 313-333, November.
- Shahzad Uddin & Bernard Gumb & Stephen Kasumba, 2011. "Trying to operationalise typologies of the spectacle: A literature review and a case study," Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 24(3), pages 288-314, March.
- Guttler, Andre & Wahrenburg, Mark, 2007. "The adjustment of credit ratings in advance of defaults," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 751-767, March.
- Celjo-Hörhager, Sanela & Niessen, Alexandra, 2006. "How do self-fulfilling prophecies affect financial ratings? An experimental study," CFR Working Papers 06-13, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
- Mattarocci, Gianluca, 2005. "Il rapporto tra impresa e agenzia di rating: la soluzione del multi-rating," MPRA Paper 4295, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2005.
- Stefano Lugo & Annalisa Croce & Robert Faff, 2015. "Herding Behavior and Rating Convergence among Credit Rating Agencies: Evidence from the Subprime Crisis," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1703-1731.
- Loffler, Gunter, 2005. "Avoiding the rating bounce: why rating agencies are slow to react to new information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 365-381, March.
More about this item
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
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