La asimetria de la informacion en la crisis financiera, el racionamiento del credito y la garantia como mecanismo simbiotico del sistema
[The information asymmetry in the financial crisis, credit rationing the guarantees and system simbiotic mechanism]
After the fall of Lehman Brothers and the start of the financial crisis is a break in economic activity, evidences a lack of financial attributed to information asymmetry experienced by the financial system. This paper will see how it has been analyzed by different economists this phenomenon that makes credit rationing and moral hazard. This issue is more severe because banking regulation establishes strict coverage criteria to operations that boost this exclusive effect. guarantee activity is beneficial for the entrepreneur and for financial institutions, finding common interests on them that, joined to the public sector, shape the guarantee activity as a policy that find the most effective coordination vectors between agents. However, test how the system no develops guarantee on the Spanish economy to achieve the desired volumes.
|Date of creation:||May 2012|
|Date of revision:|
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NBER Working Papers
2497, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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