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Pyramidal Democracy

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  • Pivato, Marcus

Abstract

We consider a decentralized, multilayered representative democracy, where citizens participate in deliberative policy formation after self-organizing into a pyramidal hierarchy of small groups. Each group elects a delegate, who expresses the deliberative consensus of that group at the next tier of the pyramid. The pyramid thus acts as a communications network which efficiently aggregates useful information and policy ideas. It is also a powerful meritocratic device, which channels legislative responsibility towards the most committed and competent citizens. This yields a practical implementation of deliberative democracy in a large polity.

Suggested Citation

  • Pivato, Marcus, 2007. "Pyramidal Democracy," MPRA Paper 3965, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:3965
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3965/1/MPRA_paper_3965.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    deliberative democracy;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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