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Competitive Selection In Non-Competitive Structure– Some Methodological Issues

Author

Listed:
  • Sen, Subir Kumar
  • Roy, Chinmoy

Abstract

The principal aim of this paper is to select a contractor who offers the best value for money. This will nearly always involve a process of competitive tendering. The final decision as to which contractor offers the best value for money will be determined by the factors like quality/price mechanism based on a numerical scoring and weighting system. However, in a political-emotional state of nature, this type of numerical scoring and weighting system, sometimes, faces the question of lack of transparency on the one hand and potential loss of resources of the authority on the other hand. This type of situation could have been resolved if the authority apply the reverse Delphi method. The advantage of this method is manifold- maintains transparency in the selection process; authority can achieved the least cost economic efficiency and, thereby, saves resources by utilising the competitive environment among the shortlisted contractors.

Suggested Citation

  • Sen, Subir Kumar & Roy, Chinmoy, 2011. "Competitive Selection In Non-Competitive Structure– Some Methodological Issues," MPRA Paper 39112, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Jun 2011.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:39112
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Holt, Charles A, Jr, 1980. "Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction Procedures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 433-445, June.
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    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • L7 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction

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