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Quasimarket failure

Author

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  • Boettke, Peter
  • Coyne, Christopher
  • Leeson, Peter

Abstract

The efficiency of “quasimarkets”—decentralized public goods provision subjected to Tiebout competition—is a staple of public choice conventional wisdom. Yet in the 1990s a countermovement in political economy called “neoconsolidationism” began to challenge this wisdom. The neoconsolidationists use the logic of government failure central to public choice economics to argue that quasimarkets fail and that jurisdictional consolidation is a superior way to supply public goods and services in metropolitan areas. Public choice scholars have largely ignored the neoconsolidationists’ challenge. This paper brings that challenge to public choice scholars’ attention with the hope of encouraging responses. It also offers some preliminary thoughts about the directions such responses might take.

Suggested Citation

  • Boettke, Peter & Coyne, Christopher & Leeson, Peter, 2011. "Quasimarket failure," MPRA Paper 33068, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:33068
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33068/1/MPRA_paper_33068.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rowley, Charles K, 1997. "Donald Wittman's The Myth of Democratic Failure: Review Article," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 15-26, July.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:55:y:1961:i:04:p:831-842_12 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Thushyanthan Baskaran & Lars P. Feld, 2013. "Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in OECD Countries," Public Finance Review, , vol. 41(4), pages 421-445, July.
    4. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
    5. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    6. Randall Holcombe & DeEdgra Williams, 2011. "The cartelization of local governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 65-74, October.
    7. repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:03:p:702-713_10 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Richard E. Wagner, 2007. "Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of Public Finance," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12713, April.
    9. Leeson, Peter T., 2011. "Government, clubs, and constitutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 301-308.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Salter, 2015. "Calhoun’s concurrent majority as a generality norm," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 375-390, September.
    2. repec:kap:pubcho:v:174:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0499-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Jayme S. Lemke, 2016. "Interjurisdictional competition and the Married Women’s Property Acts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(3), pages 291-313, March.
    4. Emily Skarbek, 2014. "The Chicago Fire of 1871: a bottom-up approach to disaster relief," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 155-180, July.
    5. Dean Stansel, 2012. "Competition, knowledge, and local government," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 25(3), pages 243-253, September.
    6. Daniel Pop & Roxana Radu, 2013. "Challenges to Local Authorities under EU Structural Funds: Evidence from Mixed Quasi-markets for Public Service Provision in Romania," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(6), pages 1108-1123, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Goods; Quasimarkets;

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets

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