A theoretical model of collusion and regulation in an electricity spot market
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsElectricity; Regulation; Collusion.;
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-07-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-07-21 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENE-2011-07-21 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-07-21 (Regulation)
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