Wage bargaining and quality competition
In a standard model of vertical differentiation, wage is assumed to determine the quality. Wage is also subject to bargaining. Increased bargaining power of the worker in the low quality firm reduces quality differential, and increases price competitiveness. The Opposite happens from a similar change in the high quality firm.
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- Gabszewicz, J. & Turrini, A., 2000.
"Workers' skills, product quality and industry equilibrium,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 575-593, May.
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & TURRINI, Alessandro, "undated". "Workers' skills, product quality and industry equilibrium," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1451, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean & TURRINI, Alessandro, 1997. "Workers’ skills, product quality and industry equilibrium," CORE Discussion Papers 1997055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Motta, Massimo, 1993. "Endogenous Quality Choice: Price vs. Quantity Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 113-131, June.
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- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & THISSE, Jacques-François, "undated". "Price competition, quality and income disparities," CORE Discussion Papers RP 370, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bughin, J., 1995. "Unions and strategic managerial incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 95-100, January.
- Dowrick, Steve, 1989. "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(398), pages 1123-1142, December.
- Kraft, Kornelius, 1998. "The codetermined firm in oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 195-201, November. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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