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Cicli politici elettorali ed evoluzione del finanziamento della sanità italiana: uno studio di lungo periodo
[Political Electoral Cycles and Evolution of Italian Health Care System Financing: a Long Run Perspective]


  • Lucarelli, Stefano


The aim of the paper is the explanation of the instability of the financing rules embracing the political-electoral cycles approach. A demonstration of the two following assertions is presented: - when Local Governments (Regions) are the sole manager of the HCS' expenditure, the increase of HCS' expenditure represents a political tool for the incumbent (a signaling towards the voters in the electoral period); - given the signaling strategy of Regions during the electoral period , Central Government is induced to decrease the ordinary financing from one hand, and to bail out (ex post financing) from the other hand. An empirical analysis of the two theoretical results is presented, concluding that the expectations on the regional elections can explain the HCS' bailing out (Italy 1981-2005). Only a better division of the responsibilities about the HCS' financing between Central Government and Regions can reduce the instability that political-electoral cycles introduce in the NHCS' financing.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucarelli, Stefano, 2008. "Cicli politici elettorali ed evoluzione del finanziamento della sanità italiana: uno studio di lungo periodo
    [Political Electoral Cycles and Evolution of Italian Health Care System Financing: a Lon
    ," MPRA Paper 28009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28009

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Massimo Bordignon & Gilberto Turati, 2003. "Bailing Out Expectations and Health Expenditure in Italy," CESifo Working Paper Series 1026, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    3. Timothy Besley, 2007. "The New Political Economy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(524), pages 570-587, November.
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    More about this item


    Cicli politici elettorali; Spesa Pubblica; Sistema sanitario nazionale; Ripiano dei disavanzi; Rapporti Stato-Regioni; Economia Italiana;

    JEL classification:

    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models


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