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Государственные Пакеты Акций В Российских Компаниях: Происхождение, Типы И Влияние На Результаты Деятельности
[Government-owned blocks of shares in Russian companies]

Author

Listed:
  • Muravyev, Alexander

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of federal state shareholdings on the performance of Russian companies. It differs from most similar studies in two respects. Firstly, it focuses on mixed ownership companies rather than conventional state enterprises. Secondly, it distinguishes between several types of federal state shareholdings, namely elected blocks, residual blocks (which may be held by two bodies with different functions – the Ministry for State Property and the Russian Fund for Federal Property) and golden shares. The paper describes the origin of federal state shareholdings and discusses their possible implications for company performance. Econometric analysis shows that companies with state ownership generally perform worse than the average firm in terms of labour productivity and profitability. However, there are remarkable differences in the performance of companies with different types of state shareholdings. These differences in performance are explained by the different degrees of control the federal state has over enterprises with various types of shareholdings – greater control is associated with better performance. The paper concludes that the government should avoid keeping equity stakes in companies unless there is a good reason to retain them. If the state wants to keep an ownership stake in a company, reliable control structures must be created.

Suggested Citation

  • Muravyev, Alexander, 2003. "Государственные Пакеты Акций В Российских Компаниях: Происхождение, Типы И Влияние На Результаты Деятельности [Government-owned blocks of shares in Russian companies]," MPRA Paper 27393, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:27393
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nellis, J., 1999. "Time to Rethink Privatization in Transition Economies?," Papers 38, World Bank - International Finance Corporation.
    2. Kouznetsov Pavel & Muravyev Alexander, 2001. "Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in Russia: The Case of Blue Chips of the Stock Market," EERC Working Paper Series 01-10e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    3. Boycko, Maxim & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1997. "Privatizing Russia," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522284, December.
    4. Dobrodey Vladimir & Gimadi Ilya & Perevalov Yuri, 2001. "The Impact of Privatisation on the Performance of Medium and Large Industrial Enterprises," EERC Working Paper Series 2k/01e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

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