Individual tradable permit market and traffic congestion: An experimental study
This paper investigates the potential of an individual tradable permit system in an experimental two-sided repeated double auction market to overcome over-consumption through road demand management. The evaluation of this system shows that traders exhibit strong dependence on reservation price and there are significant transfers of permit from low value users to high value users. During peak hours, the permit price increases owing to high demand, so the cost of using the road is high during congestion. This creates incentive for low value drivers to postpone their trips and resell permits in the peak hours to gain profit. The results show the delayer pays principle, in which drivers who value highly have to pay drivers who are willing to stay off the road during peak hours.
|Date of creation:||16 Oct 2010|
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