Leverage and trade unionism in Indian industry: An empirical note
Market power in the hands of a supplier- such as a labor union - affects an industry’s capital structure. Using panel data techniques for 1992-2004, this note shows that industries indeed appear to employ financial leverage strategically to influence collective bargaining decisions. The estimates imply that strategic incentives from input markets have a substantial impact on financing decisions
|Date of creation:||Jul 2008|
|Publication status:||Published in Indian Journal of Industrial Relations 2.46(2010): pp. 194-200|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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- Baldwin, Carliss Y, 1983. "Productivity and Labor Unions: An Application of the Theory of Self-Enforcing Contracts," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(2), pages 155-85, April.
- Stephen G. Bronars & Donald R. Deere, 1991. "The Threat of Unionization, the Use of Debt, and the Preservation of Shareholder Wealth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 231-254.
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