Allocation rules for museum pass programs
We consider natural axioms for allocating the income of museum pass programs. Two allocation rules are characterized and are shown to coincide with the Shapley value and the equal division solution of the associated TU-game introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (2003).
|Date of creation:||09 Dec 2009|
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- Victor Ginsburgh & ISRAEL Zang, 2001. "Sharing the Income of a Museum Pass Program," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/99272, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- GINSBURGH, Victor & ZANG, Israel, .
"The museum pass game and its value,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
1615, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- GINSBURGH, Victor & ZANG, IsraÃ«l, 2002. "The museum pass game and its value," CORE Discussion Papers 2002041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Victor Ginsburgh & ISRAEL Zang, 2003. "The museum pass game and its value," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/1683, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- van den Brink, Rene, 2007. "Null or nullifying players: The difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 767-775, September.
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