Reexamination of Individual Knowledge and Common Behavior Rules: A Cross-disciplinary View Based on Empirical Evidences
Based on evidences from empirical disciplines, the paper offers three different basic assumptions and one simplified framework on individual behavior when dealing with signals from uncertain environments. On the basis of these, the paper defines individual knowledge and shows its hierarchical state, the connatural- and the acquired-shared-knowledge among individuals. Furthermore, the paper describes and explains the sources and general mechanisms of changing of these kinds of knowledge, and stresses that human connatural knowledge is the most stable level in the entire knowledge, which constitutes the fundamental prerequisite for mutually recognizing signals (or events) and interactions among individuals; The acquired-shared-knowledge, however, is the common anticipation owned among individuals about behavioral response of other individuals facing a signal; it derives from interacting experiences between individuals and circumstances or among individuals; and stable accumulation of the knowledge is one of key foundations on which the stable anticipation of individual behavior, commonly behavioral beliefs and rules will can be formed in a group.
|Date of creation:||20 Dec 2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Smith, Vernon L., 2002.
"Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics,"
Nobel Prize in Economics documents
2002-7, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Vernon L. Smith, 2003. "Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 465-508, June.
- Cosmides, Leda & Tooby, John, 1994. "Better than Rational: Evolutionary Psychology and the Invisible Hand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 327-32, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:20050. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.