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Why should central banks be independent?

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  • Harashima, Taiji

Abstract

Most explanations for the necessity of an independent central bank rely on the time-inconsistency model and therefore assume that governments are weak, foolish, or untruthful and tend to cheat people. The model in this paper indicates, however, that an independent central bank is not necessary because governments are weak or foolish. Central banks must be independent because governments are economic Leviathans. Only by severing the link between the political will of a Leviathan government and economic activities is inflation perfectly guaranteed not to accelerate. A truly independent central bank is necessary because it severs this link.

Suggested Citation

  • Harashima, Taiji, 2007. "Why should central banks be independent?," MPRA Paper 1838, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 Feb 2007.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1838
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1838/1/MPRA_paper_1838.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
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    3. Taiji Harashima, 2004. "The Ultimate Source of Inflation: A Microfoundation of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level," Macroeconomics 0409018, EconWPA, revised 30 Mar 2005.
    4. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
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    6. Taiji Harashima, 2005. "The Cause of the Great Inflation: Interactions between the Government and the Monetary Policymakers," Macroeconomics 0510026, EconWPA, revised 17 Nov 2005.
    7. Leeper, Eric M., 1991. "Equilibria under 'active' and 'passive' monetary and fiscal policies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 129-147, February.
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    14. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2001. " Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Harashima, Taiji, 2007. "Hyperinflation, disinflation, deflation, etc.: A unified and micro-founded explanation for inflation," MPRA Paper 3836, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Harashima, Taiji, 2008. "A Microfounded Mechanism of Observed Substantial Inflation Persistence," MPRA Paper 10668, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Harashima, Taiji, 2007. "The Optimal Quantity of Money Consistent with Positive Nominal Interest Rates," MPRA Paper 1839, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 Feb 2007.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central Bank Independence; Inflation; The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level; Leviathan; Monetary Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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