Credit rating and bank behavior in India: Possible implications of the new Basel accord
The paper examines the impact of credit rating on capital adequacy ratios of Indian state-owned banks using quarterly data for the period 1997:1 to 2002:4. To this end, a multinomial logit model with multi credit rating indicators as dependent variable is estimated. The variables that can impinge upon capital adequacy ratio have been used as explanatory variables. Two separate models — one for long-term credit rating and another for short-term credit rating—have been estimated. The paper concludes that, both for short-term as well as for long-term ratings, capital adequacy ratios are an important factor impinging on credit rating of Indian state-owned banks.
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