IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Assimetria de Informações e Pagamento de Proventos na Bovespa
[Asymmetric Information and Dividends Payment at Bovespa]


  • Iquiapaza, Robert
  • Lamounier, Wagner
  • Amaral, Hudson


In this research it is evaluated the effect of the asymmetric information, the agency costs and the property structure in the determination of the dividend payments. The Tobit regression model was used for censured data, giving consistence to the estimates with the payout index truncated at zero. They were considered the statements of 178 open companies quoted at Bovespa, in the period of 2000-2004. It was verified that the probability of dividend payments increases with the growth possibilities, the size, the cash flow, the decrease of the company’s debt and the adhesion of the company to the governance levels. Companies with ADRs at NYSE, or with smaller asymmetric information, pay smaller dividends, what is in line with the signaling hypothesis. It was verified a negative relationship of the dividend payments with the growth opportunities and positive with the cash flow, as foreseen by the pecking order hypothesis. Lastly, after controlling by asymmetric information, the property concentration for the controller (insider) presented a negative relationship with the dividends policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Iquiapaza, Robert & Lamounier, Wagner & Amaral, Hudson, 2006. "Assimetria de Informações e Pagamento de Proventos na Bovespa
    [Asymmetric Information and Dividends Payment at Bovespa]
    ," MPRA Paper 1673, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1673

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL:
    File Function: revised version
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL:
    File Function: revised version
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Garrett, Ian & Priestley, Richard, 2000. "Dividend Behaviour and Dividend Signaling," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(02), pages 173-189, June.
    2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2000. "Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(1), pages 1-33, February.
    3. repec:hrv:faseco:30747163 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, 1961. "Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34, pages 411-411.
    5. Miller, Merton H & Rock, Kevin, 1985. " Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1031-1051, September.
    6. Ronald C. Lease, & Kose John, & Avner Kalay, & Uri Loewenstein, & Oded H. Sarig,, 1999. "Dividend Policy:: Its Impact on Firm Value," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780875844978.
    7. Mbodja Mougoué & Ramesh P. Rao, 2003. "The Information Signaling Hypothesis of Dividends: Evidence from Cointegration and Causality Tests," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3-4), pages 441-478.
    8. Myers, Stewart C., 1984. "Capital structure puzzle," Working papers 1548-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    9. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1984. "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 650-659, September.
    10. Myers, Stewart C, 1984. " The Capital Structure Puzzle," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(3), pages 575-592, July.
    11. Short, Helen & Zhang, Hao & Keasey, Kevin, 2002. "The link between dividend policy and institutional ownership," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 105-122, March.
    12. Stewart C. Myers, 1984. "Capital Structure Puzzle," NBER Working Papers 1393, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Kalay, Avner, 1982. "Stockholder-bondholder conflict and dividend constraints," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 211-233, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. repec:bbz:fcpbbr:v:10:y:2013:i:1:p:1-26 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    Dividends; asymmetric information; agency costs; property structure;

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1673. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.