IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Analyse de l'impact des coûts de participation sur la stratégie des enchérisseurs dans les Prises de contrôle
[Participation costs and optimal strategy in takeovers]


  • Burkart, Mike


We consider a takeover in which risk neutral bidders must incur participation costs and study their optimal strategy. We found that bidders decision of participation is endogenous. There is a threshold of private participation cost above that a potential bidder will stay out of takeover process. Moreover, when he decides to participate in takeover, his optimal strategy is the submission of his own valuation for the target firm. However, a bidder without initial shareholdings and with low valuation can be completely deterred by the bidder with initial shareholdings. Indeed, a who gets toeholds in the target firm, overbids when he participates in takeover. This can led to an inefficient allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Burkart, Mike, 2009. "Analyse de l'impact des coûts de participation sur la stratégie des enchérisseurs dans les Prises de contrôle
    [Participation costs and optimal strategy in takeovers]
    ," MPRA Paper 13825, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13825

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Bradley, Michael, 1980. "Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 345-376, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Partipation costs - Initial shareholdings - Private valuation - Overbidding - Takeovers;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13825. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.