Analyse de l'impact des coûts de participation sur la stratégie des enchérisseurs dans les Prises de contrôle
[Participation costs and optimal strategy in takeovers]
We consider a takeover in which risk neutral bidders must incur participation costs and study their optimal strategy. We found that bidders decision of participation is endogenous. There is a threshold of private participation cost above that a potential bidder will stay out of takeover process. Moreover, when he decides to participate in takeover, his optimal strategy is the submission of his own valuation for the target firm. However, a bidder without initial shareholdings and with low valuation can be completely deterred by the bidder with initial shareholdings. Indeed, a who gets toeholds in the target firm, overbids when he participates in takeover. This can led to an inefficient allocation.
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- Bradley, Michael, 1980. "Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 345-376, October.
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