La crisi della relazione coniugale: incoerenza dinamica e fallimenti istituzionali[Dynamic Inconsistency and Institutional Failures in Marital Breakdown]

This study examines several possible causes of marital relationship breakdown through the analytical framework of contract theory and game theory. The marital relationship is modeled as a long-term relational contract characterized by idiosyncratic investments that generate relationship-specific capital. The DRCGEL (Dynamic Relational Contract Game with Exit through Litigation) model is employed to formalize the paradox of dynamic inconsistency: the ex post rationality of forgiving a contractual breach in order to preserve the accumulated relational capital ultimately undermines the credibility of ex ante sanctions, thereby encouraging opportunistic behavior. The analysis is further extended through the DRCEEGL (Dynamic Relational Contract Enforcement Exploitation Game through Litigation) model, which demonstrates that, in the presence of information asymmetries and appropriable litigation-related advantages (such as the allocation of the marital home or spousal maintenance transfers), the legal system may evolve from a protective institution into a rent-extraction technology. This dynamic provides a sociological explanation for the marginalization of the paternal role and the erosion of his parental capacity as outcomes of an institutional failure in legislative mechanism design. The study concludes by proposing institutional reforms aimed at eliminating the profitability of conflict and strengthening incentives for cooperation.