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Tax evasion in Bosnia and Herzegovina: perceptions from taxpayers and tax inspectors

Author

Listed:
  • Terzic, Saudin
  • Dzakula, Miro
  • Muminovic, Elvir

Abstract

Tax evasion is more of a disciplinary problem, produce by numerous, big and turbulent changes. The growing problems with tax evasion are present all over the world and they require a global solution of the problem. Although tax evasion is a global phenomenon, this is also the issue that most developed countries in the world are dealing with, there are significant differences between individual countries, all depending on the legal order, the entire social system and it is depending from country to country, and this is especially evident among transitioning countries. This article analyses tax evasion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter BiH) perception from taxpayers and tax inspectors. The problem tax evasion is particularly acute in BiH. The main research result indicates that tax evasion has multiplicative effects by reducing tax evasion the situation in public finances improves substantially. In this line, this article presents the theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of tax evasion (which is not a goal in itself), including the empirical analysis factors that have the greatest influence on tax evasion by using logistic regression modelling method. The paper checks the main hypothesis by identifying the factors that affect tax evasion and by determining their significance and impact, it is possible to construct logit model for determining factors of tax evasion in BiH.

Suggested Citation

  • Terzic, Saudin & Dzakula, Miro & Muminovic, Elvir, 2020. "Tax evasion in Bosnia and Herzegovina: perceptions from taxpayers and tax inspectors," MPRA Paper 126646, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:126646
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joel Slemrod, 2007. "Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(1), pages 25-48, Winter.
    2. Robert W. McGee & Meliha Basic & Michael Tyler, 2009. "Tax evasion in Bosnia," Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 197-207.
    3. Kirchler,Erich, 2007. "The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521876742, January.
    4. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    5. Nur-tegin Kanybek D, 2008. "Determinants of Business Tax Compliance," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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