Concesiones de plazo variable para la construcción y explotación de autopistas
[Variable-term concessions for road construction and operation]
Private sector participation in infrastructure projects traditionally financed by governments (roads, airports, seaports) is increasing around the world. This paper describes how a toll road concession works. It discusses how the usual mechanism, based on a concession contract with a pre-determined fixed term, and a selection process of concessionaires through minimum-toll auctions, does not lead to optimal outcomes. In particular, it is shown how this type of mechanism in fact lies behind the frequent concession contract renegotiations observed in practice. A new mechanism is proposed, based on a flexible term concession, which is adjusted according to the actual traffic level using the road, and an auction with bids for total net revenue and maintenance costs. This new mechanism eliminates traffic risk from toll road concessions, and it guarantees an effective selection of the most efficient concessionaires.
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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- Eduardo M. R. A. Engel & Ronald D. Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2001. "Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 993-1020, October.
- Antonio Estache, 2001. "Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructure in the 1990s'," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/43998, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Newbery, David M, 1989. "Cost Recovery from Optimally Designed Roads," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 56(222), pages 165-185, May.
- Engel, Eduardo & Fischer, Ronald & Galetovic, Alexander, 1997.
"Highway Franchising: Pitfalls and Opportunities,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 68-72, May.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 1997. "Highway Franchising: Pitfalls and Opportunities," Documentos de Trabajo 15, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Hinojosa, Sergio & Gomez-Lobo, Andres, 2000. "Broad roads in a thin country - infrastructure concessions in Chile," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2279, The World Bank. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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