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Dealing with Demand Forecasting Games in Transport Privatization

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  • Antonio Estache
  • Lourdes Trujillo
  • E. Quinet

Abstract

Privatization has increased the number of players in the decision-making process for major transport investment decisions. The main argument of this paper is that this fragmentation is creating opportunities for strategic decision-making by each actor and that this is particularly obvious in the context of demand forecasting. This paper explores some of the specific causes and consequences of this new situation, including the perverse incentives, linked to the diversity of the objectives across the actors and to the risk allocation induced by the regulatory regime. It illustrates the issues and possible solutions from a wide range of modal and country experiences. In particular, it discusses the role of the newly independent sector regulators in reconciling these diverse goals and their limitations in view of the major information asymmetries problems they face. © 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Estache & Lourdes Trujillo & E. Quinet, 2002. "Dealing with Demand Forecasting Games in Transport Privatization," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/43981, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/43981
    Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Skamris, Mette K. & Flyvbjerg, Bent, 1997. "Inaccuracy of traffic forecasts and cost estimates on large transport projects," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 141-146, July.
    2. Antonio Estache, 2001. "Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructure in the 1990s'," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/43998, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    3. Eduardo M. R. A. Engel & Ronald D. Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2001. "Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 993-1020, October.
    4. Engel, Eduardo & Fischer, Ronald & Galetovic, Alexander, 1997. "Highway Franchising: Pitfalls and Opportunities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 68-72, May.
    5. Crampes, Claude & Estache, Antonio, 1997. "Regulatory tradeoffs in designing concession contracts for infrastructure networks," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1854, The World Bank.
    6. Hinojosa, Sergio & Gomez-Lobo, Andres, 2000. "Broad roads in a thin country - infrastructure concessions in Chile," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2279, The World Bank.
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