Dealing with Demand Forecasting Games in Transport Privatization
Privatization has increased the number of players in the decision-making process for major transport investment decisions. The main argument of this paper is that this fragmentation is creating opportunities for strategic decision-making by each actor and that this is particularly obvious in the context of demand forecasting. This paper explores some of the specific causes and consequences of this new situation, including the perverse incentives, linked to the diversity of the objectives across the actors and to the risk allocation induced by the regulatory regime. It illustrates the issues and possible solutions from a wide range of modal and country experiences. In particular, it discusses the role of the newly independent sector regulators in reconciling these diverse goals and their limitations in view of the major information asymmetries problems they face. © 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in: Transport policy (2002) v.9 n° 4,p.325-333|
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