Contractual and Governing Structures in Bulgarian Farming

There has been an unprecedented development in the governance of the supply of resources, services, innovations, and marketing of products of Bulgarian farms over the last two decades. However, due to insufficient (statistical, official, etc.) information and traditional inadequate (Neoclassical Economics, Agent Theory, etc.) approaches to analysis, there is no complete knowledge of the dominant forms and driving factors of governance in the main functional areas of farm management. This article incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional Economics framework and identifies the structure of governance and contractual modes used by Bulgarian farms. It is based on original and representative data collected through a survey with the managers of typical farms of different types and locations. The contemporary structure, factors and evolution of market, contract, internal, collective and hybrid modes of governance used by country's farms in the supply of natural, material, biological, financial and human resources, short-term assets, services, innovations, risk management, marketing of farm produce and services, and provision of ecosystem services, are all specified. A comparative study of the governance structures before the EU accession of the country is also made. The systemic application of the incorporated approach is needed, but it requires the collection of a new type of (micro)economic data on important characteristics of agricultural agents, different forms of governance of farm activities and relations, and critical dimensions and costs of transactions.