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Disinformation, Benefit of Group Membership, and Conscience: An Economic Model

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  • Harashima, Taiji

Abstract

Mutual trust and confidence are important to succeed not only in business but also in many other activities, which means that people do not necessarily behave totally selfishly, even in profit-maximizing activities. Non-selfish behaviors, in other words, behaviors induced by conscience and guilt, are particularly important to actualize the benefit of a group, team, organization, nation, or society as a whole. In this paper, I examine the role of conscience for the benefit of group membership and construct an economic model of conscience. Combining this model with a model of disinformation and mutual trust, I show that the level of conscience in an economy (society) is positively correlated with its efficiency and productivity. Furthermore, on the basis of this model, I discuss the political impact of conscience on, and argue that it will not be easy to establish, a democracy in a nation of low average conscience.

Suggested Citation

  • Harashima, Taiji, 2025. "Disinformation, Benefit of Group Membership, and Conscience: An Economic Model," MPRA Paper 124120, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:124120
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Harashima, Taiji, 2024. "Disinformation and Mutual Trust: An Economic Model," MPRA Paper 121865, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Rafael Di Tella & Ricardo Perez-Truglia & Andres Babino & Mariano Sigman, 2015. "Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others' Altruism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(11), pages 3416-3442, November.
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    4. Harashima, Taiji, 2022. "Asymmetric Information and Ranked Information Are Equivalent in Making Information Utilization Heterogeneous," MPRA Paper 113576, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Christine L. Exley, 2016. "Excusing Selfishness in Charitable Giving: The Role of Risk," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 587-628.
    6. Jason Dana & Roberto Weber & Jason Kuang, 2007. "Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 67-80, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Harashima, Taiji, 2025. "Disinformation and “Bad” Financial Speculations: A Mechanism behind Financial Crises," MPRA Paper 124877, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Harashima, Taiji, 2025. "Importance of Conscience in Total Factor Productivity: An Economic Model," MPRA Paper 126633, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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