Los beneficios del liderazgo en el mercado de depósitos bancarios: Una comparación entre Cournot y Stackelberg
[The benefits of leadership in the banking deposit market: A comparison between Cournot and Stackelberg]
We analyze the effects of leadership in banking when oligopolistic competition exists in the market of deposits. We assess such effects by comparing the performance of banking systems that only differ on their strategic interactions. Specifically, we compare the outcomes associated to strategies of the Cournot and Stackelberg types (symmetric competition and leader-follower strategies). Our main findings suggest that there are private and social benefits associated to leadership. The results suggest that it induces high levels of deposits, of returns and of consumption for long-term depositors. Moreover, leadership enhances financial stability and efficiency in banking.
|Date of creation:||06 Oct 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dermine, J., 1986. "Deposit rates, credit rates and bank capital : The Klein-Monti Model Revisited," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 99-114, March.
- Frederique Bracoud, 2007. "Double Bertrand competition among intermediaries when consumers can default," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(7), pages 1-16.
- Luca Colombo & Paola Labrecciosa, 2004.
"When Stackelberg and Cournot Equilibria Coincide,"
Trinity Economics Papers
20043, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:11351. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.