IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/por/obegef/035.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Public Governance and Political Corruption: A Framework for Anticorruption Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Glória Texeira

    (Faculty of Law, University of Porto, Centre for Legal and Economic Research)

  • Ary Ferreira da Cunha

    () (Faculty of Law, University of Porto, Centre for Legal and Economic Research, Observatory of Economy and Management of Fraud)

Abstract

In this paper we propose a framework of policies against political corruption. Though we have frameworks explaining the causes of corruption – mainly based on agency theory – and though many authors have considered the role of good governance in fighting corruption or the effectiveness of different anticorruption policies, we see that these branches of literature have yet not entered in dialogue to construct a framework for curbing political corruption. The framework is based on the contributions of agency theory to the field of corruption over the past decades. After all, if discretion, information asymmetries and non-coincidence of interests are the elements of agency contributing to corruption they must also be the fundamentals targeted by anticorruption policies. Based on an extensive literature survey we gather a large array of good governance policies shown to be effective against political corruption and consider how they fit in the framework. This framework may help decision makers, policy advisors, and civil society stakeholders understand and visualize their options, contributing to the construction of more comprehensive strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Glória Texeira & Ary Ferreira da Cunha, 2015. "Public Governance and Political Corruption: A Framework for Anticorruption Policy," OBEGEF Working Papers 035, OBEGEF - Observatório de Economia e Gestão de Fraude;OBEGEF Working Papers on Fraud and Corruption.
  • Handle: RePEc:por:obegef:035
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.fep.up.pt/repec/por/obegef/files/wp035.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paolo Mauro, 2004. "The Persistence of Corruption and Slow Economic Growth," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 51(1), pages 1-1.
    2. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1975. "The economics of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 187-203, February.
    3. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    4. Boubakri, Narjess & Cosset, Jean-Claude & Guedhami, Omrane, 2005. "Liberalization, corporate governance and the performance of privatized firms in developing countries," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(5), pages 767-790, October.
    5. Barry Mitnick, 1975. "The theory of agency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 27-42, December.
    6. Frey, Bruno S, 1997. "A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1043-1053, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anticorruption Policy; Public Governance; Political Corruption;

    JEL classification:

    • O29 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Other
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:por:obegef:035. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rui Henrique Alves). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.