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All Nash Equilibria of the Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction

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  • Andreas Blume
  • Paul Heidhues
  • Jonathan Lafky
  • Johannes Muenster
  • Meixia Zhang

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  • Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues & Jonathan Lafky & Johannes Muenster & Meixia Zhang, 2006. "All Nash Equilibria of the Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction," Working Paper 195, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jan 2006.
    • Handle: RePEc:pit:wpaper:195
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Holzman, Ron & Monderer, Dov, 2004. "Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 87-103, April.
    2. Plum, M, 1992. "Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(4), pages 393-418.
    3. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2004. "All equilibria of the Vickrey auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 170-177, January.
    4. Paul R. Milgrom, 1978. "Rational Expectations," Discussion Papers 406, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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