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Changes in governance, the market for corporate control, and the mechanisms for hostile takeovers in Continental Europe: The case of Arcelor?s takeover by Mittal Steel

  • Ronald Jean Degen


    (International School of Management Paris)

This paper describes the changes in governance, the market for corporate control, and the mechanism for hostile takeovers that have occurred in the last decade in Continental Europe, using the hostile takeover of Arcelor by Mittal Steel to illustrate these changes.

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Paper provided by globADVANTAGE, Polytechnic Institute of Leiria in its series Working Papers with number 87.

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Date of creation: 07 Feb 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pil:wpaper:87
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  1. Umber, Marc P. & Grote, Michael H. & Frey, Rainer, 2010. "Europe integrates less than you think: Evidence from the market for corporate control in Europe and the US," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 150, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
  2. Andriy Bodnaruk & Massimo Massa & Andrei Simonov, 2009. "Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(12), pages 4989-5026, December.
  3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  4. Andrey Golubov & Dimitris Petmezas & Nickolaos G. Travlos, 2012. "When It Pays to Pay Your Investment Banker: New Evidence on the Role of Financial Advisors in M&As," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 271-312, 02.
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