Electricity Market Design: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
This paper examines principles of market design as applied to electricity markets. I illustrate the principles with examples of both good and bad designs. I discuss one of the main design challenges—dealing with market power. I then discuss FERC’s choice of a standard market design.
|Date of creation:||2003|
|Date of revision:||07 Dec 2002|
|Publication status:||Published in Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, January, 2003|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Economics Department, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7211|
Phone: (202) 318-0520
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Web page: http://www.cramton.umd.edu
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- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995.
"Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002.
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