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I prezzi di accesso alle reti di servizi di pubblica utilità: una sintesi teorica

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  • M. Ziliotti

Abstract

L’obiettivo del lavoro è di fornire una esposizione compatta, ma il più possibile esaustiva, delle questioni teoriche che si generano laddove un’impresa dominante, verticalmente integrata, controlli l’offerta di un input indispensabile alle concorrenti (“rete”). Il conseguente problema regolatorio del prezzo di accesso, una volta esposto il meccanismo di base à la Ramsey-Boiteaux, viene affrontato esponendo le estensioni e gli approfondimenti più rilevanti sia nel caso di accesso unilaterale che reciproco. Vengono infine proposte alcune osservazioni conclusive sui trade-off che emergono fra i differenti obiettivi delle stesse policies di regolamentazione

Suggested Citation

  • M. Ziliotti, 2007. "I prezzi di accesso alle reti di servizi di pubblica utilità: una sintesi teorica," Economics Department Working Papers 2007-EP01, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
    • Handle: RePEc:par:dipeco:2007-ep01
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Agrell Per J. & Pouyet Jerome, 2008. "Regulatory Competition in Network Interconnection Pricing," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-25, March.
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    3. Ingo Vogelsang & Jorg Finsinger, 1979. "A Regulatory Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing by Multiproduct Monopoly Firms," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 157-171, Spring.
    4. Filippo VERGARA CAFFARELLI, 2004. "Non-Cooperative Network Formation with Network Maintenance Costs," Economics Working Papers ECO2004/18, European University Institute.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • L90 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - General
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

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