Existence and continuity of the optimal contract in adverse selection models with constraints
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- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017.
"A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 816-852.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2013. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," Working Papers E1304E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01509602, HAL.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," Post-Print halshs-01509602, HAL.
- Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2014. "A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement," MPRA Paper 53504, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008.
"Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 456-481, April.
- Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition," MPRA Paper 6992, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
Mixed constraints; optimal control; adverse selection;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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