Detecting Collusion through Exchange of Favors in Repeated Procurement Auctions
It is known that bid rigging in public-work auctions in Japan often takes the form of exchanging favors. In such a scheme, the winner is designated based on the amount of favor he has given to other members of the ring. By explicitly modeling gfavorh as an explanatory variable, this paper analyzes data from the public-works auctions for consulting works in Naha, Japan, to confirm that such a collusion scheme is in operation.
|Date of creation:||May 2007|
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|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/|
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