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Collective Intelligence as Collective Information Processing

Author

Listed:
  • Anwarzai, Zara
  • Moser, Cody James
  • Dromiack, Hannah
  • Garg, Ketika

    (Caltech)

  • Ramos-Fernandez, Gabriel

Abstract

Collective intelligence research spans multiple disciplines and focuses on a broad range of collective behaviors, including group problem-solving, flocking in social animals, and the formation of social knowledge. It is not apparent what these different forms of collective intelligence have in common, apart from being instances of collective behavior. In this paper, we develop a framework that enables us to better classify different forms of collectively intelligent behavior in relation to one another based on the information processing mechanisms involved. We argue that these behaviors share a common foundation, which we call collective information processing, or CIP. CIP involves two key mechanisms: (1) individual processing of group information and (2) group processing, or group-level sensitivity to the arrangement of individual information. We operationalize the CIP framework to analyze different forms of collective intelligence, both classifying them in relation to one another and in alignment with generalized quantifiable measures of information processing. Our account of collective intelligence as CIP offers a novel framework for identifying and classifying forms of collective intelligence across a wide range of disciplinary contexts. This framework is meant to unify and subsume, rather than simply challenge, existing attempts to define collective intelligence.

Suggested Citation

  • Anwarzai, Zara & Moser, Cody James & Dromiack, Hannah & Garg, Ketika & Ramos-Fernandez, Gabriel, 2025. "Collective Intelligence as Collective Information Processing," SocArXiv kg8xm_v1, Center for Open Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:kg8xm_v1
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/kg8xm_v1
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