IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/dx3aw_v1.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Risks of Preventive Attack in the Race for Advanced Artificial Intelligence

Author

Listed:
  • Burdette, Zachary
  • Demelash, Hiwot

Abstract

Will the race for advanced artificial intelligence (AI) make war more likely? If technology futurists are right that the advent of artificial general intelligence (AGI) will radically alter the global balance of power, could AGI development tempt states to resort to war to secure those advantages for themselves or to deny them to their rivals? In this working paper, we develop a framework of variables that shape preventive war risks and consider how these variables apply to AGI development. By AGI, we mean advanced artificial intelligence that can match or exceed human performance across a broad spectrum of tasks. This working paper evaluates AGI’s implications from a political rather than a technical perspective. That is, if rapid technological progress toward AGI continues, what are the political implications for international stability? Drawing from three scenarios for how preventive pressures could potentially manifest as preventive wars, the analysis suggests that the probability of war is low in absolute terms. But preventive war appears relatively more likely to occur in an attempt to preserve a monopoly on AGI than to prevent one.

Suggested Citation

  • Burdette, Zachary & Demelash, Hiwot, 2025. "The Risks of Preventive Attack in the Race for Advanced Artificial Intelligence," SocArXiv dx3aw_v1, Center for Open Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:dx3aw_v1
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/dx3aw_v1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://osf.io/download/681542bf02e2bbc872568bbc/
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.31219/osf.io/dx3aw_v1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Miller, Nicholas L., 2014. "The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(4), pages 913-944, October.
    2. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    3. Weeks, Jessica L., 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 35-64, January.
    4. Jack S. Levy, 2011. "Preventive War: Concept and Propositions," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(1), pages 87-96, March.
    5. Daron Acemoglu, 2025. "The simple macroeconomics of AI," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 40(121), pages 13-58.
    6. Muhammet A. Bas & Andrew J. Coe, 2012. "Arms Diffusion and War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 56(4), pages 651-674, August.
    7. Bas, Muhammet A. & Coe, Andrew J., 2016. "A Dynamic Theory of Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 655-685, October.
    8. Debs, Alexandre & Monteiro, Nuno P., 2014. "Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 1-31, January.
    9. Brandon K. Yoder, 2019. "Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts, Strategic Withdrawal, and Credible Signals," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(1), pages 130-145, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2018. "Confronting an enemy with unknown preferences: Deterrer or provocateur?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 124-143.
    2. Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2017. "Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: The impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 177-189.
    3. Robert Schub, 2017. "Unfair fights: Power asymmetry, nascent nuclear capability, and preventive conflict," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(4), pages 431-455, July.
    4. William Spaniel, 2022. "Scientific intelligence, nuclear assistance, and bargaining," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(4), pages 447-469, July.
    5. Scott Wolford, 2024. "The bargaining framework and Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(5), pages 485-493, September.
    6. Bradley C. Smith, 2024. "Commitment problems and Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(5), pages 494-513, September.
    7. repec:osf:socarx:38r2h_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Sasha de Vogel & Jessica S Sun, 2024. "Crisis bargaining, domestic politics and Russia's invasion of Ukraine," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(5), pages 534-555, September.
    9. Muhammet A. Bas & Aseem Mahajan, 2020. "Contesting the climate," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 162(4), pages 1985-2002, October.
    10. Douglas M Gibler & Steven V Miller, 2024. "The Militarized Interstate Events (MIE) dataset, 1816–2014," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(4), pages 463-481, July.
    11. Matthew Hauenstein, 2020. "The conditional effect of audiences on credibility," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(3), pages 422-436, May.
    12. Nakao Keisuke, 2020. "Rationalist Explanations for Two-Front War," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 26(4), pages 1-20, December.
    13. George W Williford & Douglas B Atkinson, 2020. "A Bayesian forecasting model of international conflict," The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation, , vol. 17(3), pages 235-242, July.
    14. Abbink, Klaus & Dong, Lu & Huang, Lingbo, 2023. "Preventive wars," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 552-569.
      • Klaus Abbink & Lu Dong & Lingbo Huang, 2022. "Preventive Wars," Discussion Papers 2022-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    15. Helios Herrera & Massimo Morelli & Salvatore Nunnari, 2022. "A Theory of Power Wars," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 17(1), pages 1-30, January.
    16. Tommy Andersson & Conan Mukherjee, 2021. "Seeking No War, Achieving No Peace: The Conflict over the Siachen Glacier," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(3), pages 253-270, April.
    17. Morgan, T. Clifton & Kobayashi, Yoshiharu, 2021. "Talking to the hand: Bargaining, strategic interaction, and economic sanctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    18. repec:osf:socarx:7bp4n_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Matthew Fuhrmann & Benjamin Tkach, 2015. "Almost nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency dataset," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(4), pages 443-461, September.
    20. Anne Meng, 2019. "Accessing the state: Executive constraints and credible commitment in dictatorship," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(4), pages 568-599, October.
    21. Siyu Ma & Yair Tauman & Richard Zeckhauser, 2024. "Deterrence games and the disruption of information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(1), pages 261-287, March.
    22. Randall J. Blimes, 2011. "International Conflict and Leadership Tenure," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 16, Edward Elgar Publishing.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:dx3aw_v1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arabixiv.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.