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Fundamentals-Based State-Level Forecasts of the 2020 US Presidential Election

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  • Nollenberger, Clemens
  • Unger, Gina-Maria

Abstract

Forecasts of US presidential elections have gained considerable attention in recent years. However, as became evident in 2016 with the victory of Donald Trump, most of them consider presidential elections only at the national level, neglecting that these are ultimately decided by the Electoral College. In order to improve accuracy, we believe that forecasts should instead address outcomes at the state-level to determine the eventual Electoral College winner. We develop a political economy model of the incumbent vote share across states based on different short- and long-term predictors, referring up to the end of the second quarter of election years. Testing it against election outcomes since 1980, our model correctly predicts the eventual election winner in 9 out of 10 cases – including 2016 –, with the 2000 election being the exception. For the 2020 election, it expects Trump to lose the Electoral College, as only 6.2 percent of simulated outcomes cross the required threshold of 270 Electoral Votes, with a mean prediction of 106 Electoral Votes.

Suggested Citation

  • Nollenberger, Clemens & Unger, Gina-Maria, 2020. "Fundamentals-Based State-Level Forecasts of the 2020 US Presidential Election," SocArXiv cm58f, Center for Open Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:cm58f
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/cm58f
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard J. Powell, 2004. "The Strategic Importance of State-Level Factors in Presidential Elections," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 34(3), pages 115-130, Summer.
    2. Lauderdale, Benjamin E. & Linzer, Drew, 2015. "Under-performing, over-performing, or just performing? The limitations of fundamentals-based presidential election forecasting," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 965-979.
    3. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    4. Andrew Healy & Gabriel S. Lenz, 2014. "Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters Respond Primarily to the Election‐Year Economy," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(1), pages 31-47, January.
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