IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/2fnkp.html

Death Without Benefits: Unemployment Insurance, Re-Employment, and the Spread of Covid

Author

Listed:
  • Park, Sungbin
  • Lee, Kyung Min
  • Earle, John S.

Abstract

During a pandemic, unemployment insurance (UI) may have externalities for health. Studying variation across states in UI benefits during summer 2021, using longitudinally linked Current Population Survey data, and controlling for individual and state characteristics, we find that unemployment-employment transitions rise 10 percentage points (42 percent of the unconditional mean) in treated states, which cut UI early, relative to states maintaining higher benefits. Estimates of hazards and censored regressions imply a benefit elasticity of unemployment duration of 0.5-0.7. Using an instrumental variables strategy, we find sharp covid rises in states with higher re-employment rates because of the UI cuts: case, hospitalization, and death rates are all estimated to more than double. Consistent with a causal interpretation, the differences between treated and other states in re-employment and covid outcomes are negligible prior to treatment, diverge simultaneously with the policy change, and reconverge quickly after the end of the policy difference. Results are robust to controlling for other relevant factors and policies. We estimate that additional wages of \$1.1bln received by re-employed workers offset only one-eighth of the UI losses, and, even from a government budget perspective, UI savings are more than offset by increased hospitalization costs of \$14.8bln. Increases in illness-related losses in work time can be valued at \$1.5bln. Beyond the monetary and morbidity costs of the UI cuts, we estimate additional deaths at 27,000. The results suggest an important role for UI during infectious stages of pandemics that should be considered for future policy design.

Suggested Citation

  • Park, Sungbin & Lee, Kyung Min & Earle, John S., 2024. "Death Without Benefits: Unemployment Insurance, Re-Employment, and the Spread of Covid," SocArXiv 2fnkp, Center for Open Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:2fnkp
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/2fnkp
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://osf.io/download/661054a8219e712a43f6a878/
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.31219/osf.io/2fnkp?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marinescu, Ioana & Skandalis, Daphné & Zhao, Daniel, 2021. "The impact of the Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation on job search and vacancy creation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    2. Camille Landais, 2015. "Assessing the Welfare Effects of Unemployment Benefits Using the Regression Kink Design," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 243-278, November.
    3. Orley Ashenfelter, 2006. "Measuring the Value of a Statistical Life: Problems and Prospects," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(510), pages 10-23, March.
    4. David Card & Andrew Johnston & Pauline Leung & Alexandre Mas & Zhuan Pei, 2015. "The Effect of Unemployment Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment Insurance Receipt: New Evidence from a Regression Kink Design in Missouri, 2003-2013," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(5), pages 126-130, May.
    5. Ganong, Peter & Noel, Pascal & Vavra, Joseph, 2020. "US unemployment insurance replacement rates during the pandemic," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    6. Kiefer, Nicholas M, 1988. "Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 646-679, June.
    7. Julia A. Rivera Drew & Sarah Flood & John Robert Warren, 2014. "Making full use of the longitudinal design of the Current Population Survey: Methods for linking records across 16 months\m{1}," Journal of Economic and Social Measurement, IOS Press, issue 3, pages 121-144.
    8. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
    9. Johannes F. Schmieder & Till von Wachter, 2016. "The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Benefits: New Evidence and Interpretation," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 547-581, October.
    10. Kory Kroft & Matthew J. Notowidigdo, 2016. "Should Unemployment Insurance Vary with the Unemployment Rate? Theory and Evidence," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(3), pages 1092-1124.
    11. Johannes F. Schmieder & Till von Wachter & Stefan Bender, 2012. "The Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Estimates Over 20 Years," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(2), pages 701-752.
    12. Katz, Lawrence F. & Meyer, Bruce D., 1990. "The impact of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 45-72, February.
    13. Sanderson, Eleanor & Windmeijer, Frank, 2016. "A weak instrument F-test in linear IV models with multiple endogenous variables," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 190(2), pages 212-221.
    14. Elira Kuka & Na'ama Shenhav & Kevin Shih, 2020. "Do Human Capital Decisions Respond to the Returns to Education? Evidence from DACA," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 293-324, February.
    15. Johannes F. Schmieder† & Till von Wachter & Stefan Bender, 2011. "The Effects Of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over The Business Cycle: Evidence From Regression Discontinuity Estimates Over Twenty Years," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2011-063, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    16. Baily, Martin Neil, 1978. "Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 379-402, December.
    17. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
    18. Christopher Boone & Arindrajit Dube & Lucas Goodman & Ethan Kaplan, 2021. "Unemployment Insurance Generosity and Aggregate Employment," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 58-99, May.
    19. Petrosky-Nadeau, Nicolas & Valletta, Robert G., 2021. "UI Generosity and Job Acceptance: Effects of the 2020 CARES Act," IZA Discussion Papers 14454, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    20. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 13967, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Krueger, Alan B. & Meyer, Bruce D., 2002. "Labor supply effects of social insurance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 33, pages 2327-2392, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:osf:socarx:2fnkp_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Johannes Spinnewijn, 2020. "The Trade‐Off between Insurance and Incentives in Differentiated Unemployment Policies," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(1), pages 101-127, March.
    3. Liepmann, Hannah & Pignatti, Clemente, 2024. "Welfare effects of unemployment benefits when informality is high," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    4. Raj Chetty & Amy Finkelstein, 2012. "Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data," NBER Working Papers 18433, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Joaquín Herrera & Martin González-Rozada & Hernan Ruffo, 2025. "The Fiscal Costs of Unemployment Insurance," Department of Economics Working Papers 2025_09, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    6. David S. Lee & Pauline Leung & Christopher J. O’Leary & Zhuan Pei & Simon Quach, 2021. "Are Sufficient Statistics Necessary? Nonparametric Measurement of Deadweight Loss from Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(S2), pages 455-506.
    7. Juliana MESÉN VARGAS & Bruno VAN DER LINDEN, 2017. "Is there always a trade-off between insurance and incentives? The case of unemployment with subsistence constraints," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2017014, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    8. Parolin, Zachary & Pignatti, Clemente, 2024. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Program Interactions," IZA Discussion Papers 17095, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Robert Valletta, 2014. "Recent extensions of U.S. unemployment benefits: search responses in alternative labor market states," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 3(1), pages 1-25, December.
    10. Konstantinos Tatsiramos & Jan C. Ours, 2014. "Labor Market Effects Of Unemployment Insurance Design," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 284-311, April.
    11. Johannes F. Schmieder & Till von Wachter, 2016. "The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Benefits: New Evidence and Interpretation," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 547-581, October.
    12. Andreas Hornstein & Marios Karabarbounis & Andre Kurmann & Etienne Lale & Lien Ta, 2023. "Disincentive Effects of Unemployment Insurance Benefits," Working Paper 23-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    13. Altmann, Steffen & Cairo, Sofie & Mahlstedt, Robert & Sebald, Alexander, 2022. "Do Job Seekers Understand the UI Benefit System (And Does It Matter)?," IZA Discussion Papers 15747, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Laura Khoury & Clément Brébion & Simon Briole, 2019. "Entitled to Leave: the Impact of Unemployment Insurance Eligibility on Employment Duration and Job Quality," Working Papers halshs-02393383, HAL.
    15. Anna D'Ambrosio & Vincenzo Scrutinio, 2022. "A few Euro more: benefit generosity and the optimal path of unemployment benefits," CEP Discussion Papers dp1835, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    16. Schmieder, Johannes F & Trenkle, Simon, 2020. "Disincentive effects of unemployment benefits and the role of caseworkers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 182(C).
    17. Sarah H. Bana & Kelly Bedard & Maya Rossin‐Slater, 2020. "The Impacts of Paid Family Leave Benefits: Regression Kink Evidence from California Administrative Data," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(4), pages 888-929, September.
    18. Jiang, Hanchen & Quintero, Luis & Yang, Xi, 2025. "Does rent control increase tenant unemployment?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).
    19. Guo, Audrey, 2020. "The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Taxation on Multi-Establishment Firms," MPRA Paper 97919, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Pauline Leung & Christopher J. O'Leary, 2015. "Should UI Eligibility Be Expanded to Low-Earning Workers? Evidence on Employment, Transfer Receipt, and Income from Administrative Data," Upjohn Working Papers 15-236, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    21. Arash Nekoei & Andrea Weber, 2017. "Does Extending Unemployment Benefits Improve Job Quality?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(2), pages 527-561, February.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:2fnkp. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arabixiv.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.