Internal Pricing and Cost Allocation for Efficient Decentralized Control
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|Date of creation:||Sep 1986|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014|
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Martin Shubik, 1962.
"Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing,"
INFORMS, vol. 8(3), pages 325-343, April.
- Martin Shubik, 1961. "Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 112, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Martin Shubik, 1984. "The Cooperative Form, the Value and the Allocation of Joint Costs and Benefits," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 706, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Theodore Groves & Martin Loeb, 1979. "Incentives in a Divisionalized Firm," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(3), pages 221-230, March.
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