IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nwu/cmsems/1450.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Dynamic Cost-Per-Action Mechanisms and Applications to Online Advertising

Author

Listed:
  • Hamid Nazerzadeh
  • Amin Saberi
  • Rakesh Vohra

Abstract

We examine the problem of allocating a resource repeatedly over time amongst a set of agents. The utility that each agent derives from consumption of the item is private information to that agent and, prior to consumption may be unknown to that agent. The problem is motivated by keyword auctions, where the resource to be allocated is a slot on a search page. We describe a mechanism based on a sampling-based learning algorithm that under suitable assumptions is asymptotically individually rational, asymptotically Bayesian incentive compatible and asymptotically ex-ante efficient. The mechanism can be interpreted as a cost per action keyword auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Hamid Nazerzadeh & Amin Saberi & Rakesh Vohra, 2007. "Dynamic Cost-Per-Action Mechanisms and Applications to Online Advertising," Discussion Papers 1450, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1450
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1450.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki, 2006. "Efficient Dynamic Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000580, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721, April.
    3. Susan Athey & Ilya Segal, 2013. "An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2463-2485, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    dynamic auctions; sponsored search;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1450. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fran Walker). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cmnwuus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.