Efficient Dynamic Auctions
We consider the truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We show that a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent, leads to truthtelling in every period. A leading example of a dynamic allocation model is the sequential auction of a single good in which the current winner of the object receives additional information about her valuation. We show that a modified sequential second price auction in which only the current winner makes a positive payment leads to truthtelling. In general allocation problems, the marginal contribution mechanism continues to induce truthtelling in every period but may now include positive transfers for many agents.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.yale.edu/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
- repec:oup:restud:v:52:y:1985:i:2:p:173-91 is not listed on IDEAS
- Susan Athey & Ilya Segal, 2007.
"An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism,"
122247000000001134, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1998.
"Dynamic Common Agency,"
1259, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- repec:oup:qjecon:v:115:y:2000:i:2:p:341-388 is not listed on IDEAS
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1584. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Glena Ames)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.