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Migration Between Platforms

Author

Listed:
  • Gary Biglaiser

    (University of North Carolina, Department of Economics)

  • Jacques CreÌ mer

    (Toulouse School of Economics)

  • AndreÌ Veiga

    (Toulouse School of Economics)

Abstract

We develop a model of dynamic platform formation under positive platform externalities. Users can switch between an incumbent and entrant platforms, switching opportunities arise stochastically and users can choose whether to accept or reject an opportunity to switch. For homogeneous users, we characterize the incumbency advantage implied by a given equilibrium realization of the switching process. For linear utility, incumbency advantage increases in the mean and dispersion of the incumbent’s share during the switching process, which captures the momentum and coordination of the process. Heterogeneity in preferences may lead some users to delay their switching or never switch at all. Assuming that switching opportunities arrive according to a Poisson process, users switch to the entrant platform if the average preference favors the entrant and if preferences are not too polarized.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary Biglaiser & Jacques CreÌ mer & AndreÌ Veiga, 2013. "Migration Between Platforms," Working Papers 13-18, NET Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:1318
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. E. Glen Weyl, 2010. "A Price Theory of Multi-sided Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1642-1672, September.
    2. Ochs, Jack & Park, In-Uck, 2010. "Overcoming the coordination problem: Dynamic formation of networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 689-720, March.
    3. Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 1.
    4. József Sákovics & Jakub Steiner, 2012. "Who Matters in Coordination Problems?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3439-3461, December.
    5. Farrell, Joseph & Klemperer, Paul, 2007. "Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 31, pages 1967-2072, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • R23 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure

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