Making Altruism Pay in Auction Quotas
With imperfectly competitive product markets, producers react to the auction of quota licenses by adjusting price upwards from the free trade level. As a result, license revenues are significantly lower than if markets were perfectly competitive. In fact, they are often zero unless quotas are very restrictive. In such markets, giving part of these revenues to the producers reduces the incentive to raise product prices and leads to the reappearance of revenues from auctioning quota licenses. With a foreign monopoly and no price discrimination, such a policy can lead to a Pareto improvement over free trade. The conditions under which such altruism raises welfare both from free trade and from the status quo are explored.
|Date of creation:||Jan 1990|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as International Trade and Trade Policy, edited by E. Helpman and A. Razin June, 1991 MIT Press: Cambridge, MA|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Svedberg, Peter, 1979. "Optimal Tariff Policy on Imports from Multinationals," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 55(148), pages 64-67, March.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1983.
"Trade Warfare: Tariffs and Cartels,"
NBER Working Papers
1193, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert C. Feenstra, 1989. "Auctioning U.S. Import Quotas, Foreign Response, and Alternative Policies," NBER Working Papers 2839, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
- Neary, J.P & Roberts, K.W.S, 1978.
"The Theory of Household Behaviour under Rationing,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
132, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3230. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.