IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/2699.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Strategic Altruism Model In Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold

Author

Listed:
  • Laurence J. Kotlikoff
  • Assaf Razin
  • Robert W. Rosenthal

Abstract

This article demonstrates that Ricardian Equivalence does not necessarily hold in models with altruistic transfers once one takes into account the strategic behavior of recipients as well as donors. To influence the final allocation of consumption in altruistic settings, potential recipients can threaten to refuse as well as accept transfers. We apply the Extended Nash Bargaining Solution to the problem of an altruistic parent and a possibly altruistic child. The parent and child first choose a threat point noncooperatively; this threat point then influences the final allocation of consumption through the standard Nash Bargaining Solution, While the potential recipient can refuse transfers from the potential donor, he cannot refuse transfers from the government. When the government redistributes between the parent and child, it changes their endowments and the equilibrium threats, and thus the final allocation of consumption. The feature of the cooperative model presented here that leads to the failure of Ricardian Equivalence may be characteristic of a wider class of cooperative and noncooperative altruism models. This feature is that noninterior strategic postures underlie interior transfer behavior and that these non- interior strategic postures are altered by government redistribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Assaf Razin & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1988. "A Strategic Altruism Model In Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold," NBER Working Papers 2699, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2699
    Note: PE
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w2699.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec..
    2. Kimball, Miles S., 1987. "Making sense of two-sided altruism," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 301-326, September.
    3. Abel, Andrew B, 1987. "Operative Gift and Bequest Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1037-1047, December.
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    5. Carmichael, Jeffrey, 1982. "On Barro's Theorem of Debt Neutrality: The Irrelevance of Net Wealth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 202-213, March.
    6. Drazen, Allan, 1978. "Government Debt, Human Capital, and Bequests in a Life-Cycle Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(3), pages 505-516, June.
    7. Feldstein, Martin, 1988. "The Effects of Fiscal Policies when Incomes Are Uncertain: A Contradiction to Ricardian Equivalence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 14-23, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Soares, Jorge, 2015. "Borrowing constraints, parental altruism and welfare," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-20.
    2. Salma Slimani, 2016. "Threshold Effects of Fiscal Policy on Economic Activity in Developing Countries," International Journal of Business and Social Research, MIR Center for Socio-Economic Research, vol. 6(3), pages 20-37, March.
    3. Wolff, Francois-Charles & Laferrere, Anne, 2006. "Microeconomic models of family transfers," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Elsevier.
    4. Yang-Ming Chang, 2012. "Strategic transfers, redistributive fiscal policies, and family bonds: a micro-economic analysis," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 25(4), pages 1481-1502, October.
    5. Peter Prazmowski, 2014. "Ricardian equivalence and fiscal distortions in the Dominican Republic," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 109-125, February.
    6. Altonji, Joseph G & Hayashi, Fumio & Kotlikoff, Laurence J, 1997. "Parental Altruism and Inter Vivos Transfers: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1121-1166, December.
    7. Rebelein, Robert P, 1998. "Ricardian Equivalence Survives Strategic Behavior," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 53(2), pages 195-228.
    8. Altonji, Joseph G & Hayashi, Fumio & Kotlikoff, Laurence J, 1992. "Is the Extended Family Altruistically Linked? Direct Tests Using Micro Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1177-1198, December.
    9. Genicot, Garance, 2016. "Two-sided altruism and signaling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 92-97.
    10. Julian Jamison, 2012. "Games with Synergistic Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(1), pages 1-15, March.
    11. Eunji Kim & Yoonhee Ha & Sangheon Kim, 2017. "Public Debt, Corruption and Sustainable Economic Growth," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 9(3), pages 1-30, March.
    12. Altig, David & Davis, Steven J., 1993. "Borrowing constraints and two-sided altruism with an application to social security," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 467-494, May.
    13. Kotlikoff, Laurence J., 2002. "Generational policy," Handbook of Public Economics,in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 27, pages 1873-1932 Elsevier.
    14. Severinov, Sergei, 2006. "Bequests as signals: Implications for fiscal policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 1995-2008, November.
    15. Dobrescu, Loretti I. & Kotlikoff, Laurence J. & Motta, Alberto, 2012. "Why aren't developed countries saving?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1261-1275.
    16. Zhang, Jie, 2006. "Second-best public debt with human capital externalities," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 347-360, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2699. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: () or (Joanne Lustig). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.